Awesome Ethereum Finance / Financial Computing / Encryption Content (zk, obvram, circuts, smpc, etc) |
The 1st BIU Winter School SECURE COMPUTATION AND EFFICIENCY | | | |
The 5th BIU Winter School ADVANCES IN PRACTICAL MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION | | | |
Simons Securing Computation Workshop | | | |
Simons Cryptography Boot Camp | | | |
DIMACS/Columbia Data Science Institute Workshop on Cryptography for Big Data | | | |
DIMACS/MACS Workshop on Cryptography for the RAM Model of Computation | | | |
DIMACS/MACS Workshop on Usable, Efficient, and Formally Verified Secure Computation | | | |
Awesome Ethereum Finance / MEV |
A performance benchmark on mempool services | | | |
Escaping the Dark Forest | | | |
Ethereum is a Dark Forest | | | |
Ethereum Blockspace - Who Gets What and Why | | | |
Ethology: A Safari Tour in Ethereum’s Dark Forest | | | |
Five theses about transaction ordering, MEV, and front-running | | | |
Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges | | | |
Flashbots: Frontrunning the MEV Crisis | | | |
Frontrunner Jones and the Raiders of the Dark Forest: An Empirical Study of Frontrunning on the Ethereum Blockchain | | | |
Front-Running as a Service | | | |
Gas Gambits — Game Theory Example of Incentivized Collaboration | | | |
High-Frequency Trading on Decentralized On-Chain Exchanges | | | |
RETURN TO THE DARK FOREST | | | |
MEV Auction: Auctioning transaction ordering rights as a solution to Miner Extractable Value | | | |
MEV and Me | | | |
MEV auctions considered harmful | | | |
MEVA (What is it good for?) | | | |
On the instability of Bitcoin without the block reward | | | |
Quantifying Blockchain Extractable Value: How dark is the forest? | | | |
Quantifying MEV | | | |
Staring Into the Monster’s Eye: Analyzing a Generalized Front-Running Ethereum Arbitrage Bot Attack | | | |
Surrogeth: Tricking frontrunners into being transaction relayers | | | |
The enemy of your enemy is NOT your friend | | | |
To Sink Frontrunners, Send in the Submarines | | | |
Uncle Bandit Attack | | | |
What Is Miner-Extractable Value (MEV)? | | | |
Wrecking sandwich traders for fun and profit | 1,786 | over 1 year ago | |
Awesome Ethereum Finance / MEV / Garbled circuits |
paper | | | An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries, 2017 |
paper | | | Billion-Gate Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries, 2012 |
paper | | | Secure Two-Party Computation via Cut-and-Choose Oblivious Transfer, 2011 |
paper | | | Fast Cut-and-Choose-Based Protocols for Malicious and Covert Adversaries, 2013 |
paper | | | Two-Output Secure Computation with Malicious Adversaries, 2011 |
paper | | | Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation Using Symmetric Cut-and-Choose, 2013 |
paper | | | Amortizing Garbled Circuits, 2014 |
paper | | | Non-Interactive Secure Computation Based on Cut-and-Choose |
Awesome Ethereum Finance / MEV / LEGO |
paper | | | LEGO for Two-Party Secure Computation, 2009 |
paper | | | MiniLEGO: Efficient Secure Two-Party Computation from General Assumptions, 2013 |
paper | | | TinyLEGO: An Interactive Garbling Scheme for Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation, 2015 |
paper | | | Constant Round Maliciously Secure 2PC with Function-independent Preprocessing using LEGO, 2017 |